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A Rollback in the History of
Communication-Induced Checkpointing
Islene C. Garcia, Gustavo M. D. Vieira, and Luiz E. Buzato
Abstract—The literature on communication-induced checkpointing presents a family of protocols that use logical clocks to control
whether forced checkpoints must be taken. For many years, HMNR, also called Fully Informed (FI), was the most complex and
efficient protocol of this family. The Lazy-FI protocol applies a lazy strategy that defers the increase of logical clocks, resulting in
a protocol with better perfomance for distributed systems where processes can take basic checkpoints at different, asymmetric,
rates. Recently, the Fully Informed aNd Efficient (FINE) protocol was proposed using the same control structures as FI, but with
a stronger and, presumably better, checkpoint-inducing condition. FINE and its lazy version, called Lazy-FINE, would now be the
most efficient checkpointing protocols based on logical clocks. This paper reviews this family of protocols, proves a theorem on
a condition that must be enforced by all stronger versions of FI, and proves that both FINE and Lazy-FINE do not guarantee the
absence of useless checkpoints. As a consequence, FI and Lazy-FI can be rolled back to the position of most efficient protocols
of this family of index-based checkpointing protocols.
Index Terms—Reliability, Checkpointing/restart, Fault-tolerance
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
CHECKPOINTING is a widely used technique thatprovides fault-tolerance to distributed systems.
A local checkpoint is a state of a process that can
be recovered after a crash. A consistent global check-
point [1] is a set of local checkpoints that can be used
to recover a system after a global failure. If processes
take checkpoints at their own pace, a consistent global
checkpoint may not be formed, and, in the worst case,
the application may need to rollback to its initial state
after a failure. This is the well-known domino effect [2]
caused by the presence of useless checkpoints [3].
Some checkpointing protocols avoid useless check-
points by using a coordinator and control mes-
sages [1], [4]. Others use a communication-induced
approach: processes can take basic checkpoints au-
tonomously, but the protocol uses information ob-
tained from the exchange of messages among the
processes to induce forced ones and, thus, to elim-
inate the occurrence of useless checkpoints [5], [6].
Checkpoint-inducing conditions based on information
stored in local variables and messages received are
used to control whether a forced checkpoint must
be taken before delivering the payload of a message
to the application. Therefore, communication-induced
protocols are often compared in terms of the number
of forced checkpoints and the size of the state (data
structures) maintained by each process to support the
• I. C. Garcia and L. E. Buzato are with the Institute of Computing,
University of Campinas, Brazil.
E-mail: {islene, buzato}@ic.unicamp.br
• G. M. D. Vieira is with the Department of Computing at Sorocaba,
CCGT, Federal University of Sa˜o Carlos, Brazil.
E-mail: gdvieira@ufscar.br
Manuscript received [date]; revised [date].
decision to take a forced checkpoint. The least the
number of forced checkpoints taken and the size of
the data structures used the better.
Communication-induced index-based checkpoint-
ing protocols implement a variant of Lamport’s logi-
cal clock [7] to state checkpoint-inducing conditions.
Protocols that use this approach, such as [8], [9], [10],
and [11], enforce an easily observable property that
guarantees that checkpoints stamped with the same
clock value form a consistent global checkpoint [10].
Furthermore, index-based protocols have presented
better performance than protocols based on the track-
ing of specific checkpoint patterns [12], [13].
Unfortunately, no matter what mechanism is used
to trigger forced checkpoints, there is not an opti-
mal checkpointing protocol for all checkpoint and
communication patterns [14]. However, for a par-
ticular family of protocols, a stronger (more restric-
tive) condition always produces a protocol that takes
fewer checkpoints than a protocol based on a weaker
condition [14]. Evidence obtained from experimental
comparisons of checkpointing protocols also indicate
that stronger conditions usually lead to more efficient
protocols [10], [15].
For many years, the HMNR protocol [10] im-
plemented the strongest index-based checkpoint-
inducing condition. This protocol has also been called
Fully Informed (FI) [11], because it propagates de-
tailed information about the causal past of the pro-
cesses. Eventually, the literature began to show efforts
to produce further optimized versions of FI. The Lazy-
FI [16] approach applies the lazy strategy [17] to
increment logical clocks of FI. The Fully Informed
aNd Efficient (FINE) protocol [15], [18] is based on a
checkpoint condition stronger than the one defined for
2FI but using the same control information maintained
by FI. A lazy version of this protocol, called Lazy-
FINE was also proposed [19]. The S-FI [20] protocol
aims to take the same number of forced checkpoints
as FI, but employing a reduced amount of information
per message exchanged, an improvement that makes
the protocol more scalable. The DCFI [21] delays non-
forced checkpoints in order to reduce the total number
of checkpoints in the system.
The contributions of the paper are three. Firstly, it
reviews the FI [10] and Lazy-FI [16] checkpointing
protocols to single out the similaries in logical struc-
ture of the conditions used by them to trigger forced
checkpoints. Secondly, it proves a theorem that shows
that checkpoint-inducing condition of FI cannot be
strengthened without respecting the timestamping
rules that guarantee the absence of useless check-
points. Thirdly, it shows that FINE [15] and Lazy-
FINE [19] fail the test established by the theorem, thus
causing a rollback in the history of communication-
induced checkpointing protocols: FI and Lazy-FI are
back as the most efficient protocols of this family of
index-based checkpointing protocols.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents fundamental concepts. Section 3 ad-
dresses index-based checkpointing, describing FI [10]
and Lazy-FI [16]. Section 4 presents FINE [15] and
Lazy-FINE [19], the theorem about the correctness of
FI optimizations, and the checkpoint scenarios that
show that these protocols may lead to useless check-
points. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
This section defines the meaning of distributed com-
putation, checkpoint, consistent global checkpoint and
the mechanisms used to track whether checkpoints
belong or not to a consistent global checkpoint.
2.1 Distributed computation
A set of n processes (P1, . . . , Pn) that communi-
cate strictly via unicast messages forms a distributed
computation. The communication graph is complete,
the channels are reliable, but the transmission delays
are unpredictable. There is no global clock or shared
memory.
Every process Pi starts with an event ei,1 and
executes a possibly infinite sequence of events
(ei,1, ei,2, . . .). An internal event can only influence
the state of the process that has executed it. Exter-
nal events can be the sending or the receiving of
messages. Given global time absence, events can be
ordered using solely the notion of “cause-and-effect”
enabled by the flow of information generated by
the ocurrence of internal and external events. Thus,
causality can be captured by the causally precedes
relation over events of a distributed computation [7].
P1 ✲❚
C1,1
(1)
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
m1
(1)
❚
C1,2
(2)
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
m4
(2)
❚
C1,3
(3)
P2 ✲❚
C2,1
(1)
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
m2
(1)
❚
C2,2
(2)
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
m3
(2)
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
m5
(2)
P3 ✲❚
C3,1
(1)
I3,1
❚
C3,2
(2)
❚
C3,3
(3)
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
m6
(3)
Fig. 1. Processes, checkpoints, and logical clocks
Definition 2.1 (Causal precedence). Event ei,x causally
precedes ej,y (ei,x → ej,y) if
• i = j and y = x+ 1, or
• ∃m : ei,x = send(m) and ej,y = receive(m), or
• ∃ek,z : ei,x → ek,z ∧ ek,z → ej,y .
2.2 Fault tolerance and checkpoints
We assume the crash-recover fault model, that is,
in the case of a failure, a process halts and looses
its volatile state. During correct execution, processes
frequently save their states to stable storage to make
possible the recovery of a process (system) by way of
a rollback to an earlier consistent state in the case of
partial or total system failure.
A checkpoint is the local state of a process that was
saved on stable storage. Every process Pi has an initial
checkpoint, denoted by Ci,1, and other checkpoints
can be saved along the computation. The x-th check-
point of a process Pi is denoted by Ci,x. An interval
Ii,x is the set of events from Ci,x to Ci,x+1, including
Ci,x but excluding Ci,x+1.
Let us assume that a process Pi manages a logical
clock lci that is used to timestamp a checkpoint Ci,x
with Ci,x.t and a message m with m.t. The following
rules guarantee that if Ci,x → Cj,y then Ci,x.t <
Cj,y.t [10]. These rules can be seen as a specialization
of the Lamport’s clock [7] that increments lci only at
the occurrence of checkpoints.
• Pi initializes lci at the beginning of the computa-
tion;
• Pi increments lci before it saves a checkpoint C
and sets C.t = lci.
• when Pi sends a message m, it piggybacks lci on
the message (denoted m.t);
• when Pi receives a message m, it sets lci to
max(lci,m.t).
Fig. 1 depicts a distributed computation. Horizontal
lines represent processes, one line per process. Time
flows from left to right. Slanted arrows represent
messages. Black rectangles are basic checkpoints. The
values of the logical clocks—timestamps—associated
with each event of interest to the distributed compu-
tation are depicted as integers between parentheses.
3A checkpoint interval is represented by a left-closed
right-open line segment, for example, I3,1.
2.3 Consistency
A consistent global checkpoint is formed by a
set of checkpoints that are unrelated by causal
precedence [1]. In Fig. 1, for example, the set
{C1,2, C2,2, C3,2} is a consistent global checkpoint.
Definition 2.2 (Consistent global checkpoint). A global
checkpoint {C1,x1, . . . , Cn,xn} is consistent if
∀i, j : Ci,xi 6→ Cj,xj .
When two causally unrelated checkpoints cannot
be part of the same consistent global checkpoint they
must be connected by a sequence of messages called
a zigzag path [3].
Definition 2.3 (Zigzag path). A sequence of messages
µ = [ml1, . . . ,mlq] is a zigzag path from Ci,x to Cj,y if
• Pi sends ml1 after Ci,x, and
• if mlz , 1 ≤ z < q, is received by Pk, then mlz+1 is
sent by Pk in the same or a later checkpoint interval,
and
• mlq is received by Pj before Cj,y .
The existence of a zigzag path from Ci,x to Cj,y
is denoted by Ci,x
z
−→ Cj,y . In Fig. 1, [m1,m2] is a
zigzag path from C1,1 to C3,2 such that C1,1 causally
precedes C3,2, being an example of a causal zigzag path.
The zigzag path [m4,m3] is an example of a non-causal
zigzag path from C1,2 to C3,3.
Definition 2.4 (Z-cycle). Ci,x
z
−→ Ci,x
A zigzag path from a checkpoint to itself forms a
Z-cycle and makes it impossible for this checkpoint
to be part of any consistent global checkpoint. A Z-
cycle is the exact condition under which a checkpoint
becomes useless [3]. In Fig. 1, C3,3 is useless due to
the Z-cycles [m6,m3] and [m6,m5,m4,m3].
2.3.1 Z-consistent timestamping
Definition 2.5 (Z-consistent timestamping). A times-
tamping is consistent with the existence of zigzag paths
if
Ci,x
z
−→ Cj,y ⇒ Ci,x.t < Cj,y .t
A Z-consistent timestamping does not admit a Z-
cycle, say C
z
−→ C, since the relationship C.t < C.t is
impossible using integers as timestamps [10], [22].
Fig. 1 does not present a Z-consistent timestamping,
since C3,3
z
−→ C1,3 and C3,3.t = C1,3.t. Fig. 2 shows
the same basic checkpoint and communication pattern
of Fig. 1 augmented with one forced checkpoint, rep-
resented by a black diamond. This extra checkpoint
allows the Z-consistent timestamping under the rules
presented in Section 2.2. In the next section, forced
checkpoints induced by checkpointing protocols will
guarantee the enforcement of Z-consistent timestamp-
ing.
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(1)
❆
❆
❆❯
m1
(1)
❚
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❆
❆
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❚
(3)
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✁
✁✕m6
(3)
Fig. 2. Z-consistent timestamping
Pj . . . ✲❚
Cj,y
(3)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m2
(3)
Pi . . . ✲❚
(3)
m1
(3)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
¬◆
Pk . . . ✲❚
(3)
¬◆
❚
Ck,z
(4)
(a)
Pj . . . ✲❚
Cj,y
(4)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m2
(4)
Pi . . . ✲❚
(3)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m1
(3)
◆
Ci,x+1
(4)
Pk . . . ✲❚
(2)
¬◆
❚
Ck,z
(4)
(b)
Fig. 3. Partly-informed strategy
3 INDEX-BASED CHECKPOINTING
This section starts with the description of a partly-
informed strategy to induce forced checkpoints. After
that, it presents the fully-informed and lazy strategies
describing data structures and checkpoint-inducing
conditions that can be used to reduce the number
of forced checkpoints in comparison to the partly-
informed strategy.
3.1 Partly-informed strategy
The partly-informed strategy produces a Z-consistent
timestamping by not allowing logical clocks to de-
crease along a zigzag path. Let us consider zigzag
paths composed by two messages [m2,m1], as the
ones depicted in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3a, Pi receives m2
and m2.t = m1.t. In Fig. 3b, Pi receives m2, and since
m2.t > m1.t, Pi takes a forced checkpoint, represented
by a black diamond, before delivering m2 to the
application.
This approach can be implemented by the following
control structures [10]:
• Boolean array sent toi[1 . . . n]: sent toi[j] indi-
cates whether processes Pi has sent a message
to Pj in the current checkpointing interval.
• Array min toi[1 . . . n]: min toi[j] indicates the
timestamp of the first message sent in the current
interval by Pi to Pj or +∞ if no such message has
been sent.
The partly-informed checkpoint-inducing condition
CPI, evaluated by process Pi when it receives a mes-
sage m, can be expressed as [10]:
CPI ≡ ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧m.t > min toi[k]
4As a consequence of the partly-informed strategy,
Pk does not need to take a checkpoint before the
reception of m1, even when m1.t is greater than lck,
as in Fig. 3b.
3.2 Fully-informed strategy
Taking into account a zigzag path [m2,m1] from
Cj,y to Ck,z , like the ones depicted on Fig. 3, the
fully-informed strategy [10] explores Pi’s information
about Ck,z .t to establish if Z-consistent timestamping
is being preserved. This information is propagated
by piggybacking timestamp vectors and checkpoint
vectors that carry causal information about Pk to Pi.
Strengthening the partly-informed strategy
Let us assume that each process Pi maintains and
propagates an array with information about the log-
ical clock of all processes in the computation. Let us
define the vector clocki, such that clocki[i] is equiv-
alent to lci and clocki[k] is the highest value of lck
that Pi knows about due to a traditional piggybacking
mechanism. Fig. 4 illustrates timestamp vectors, with
the logical clocks of processes and messages empha-
sized in boldface.
In Fig. 4a, there is a message receive where the CPI
condition is true. P2 sends a message m1 to P3 with
m1.t = 1 and it receives m3 from P1 with m3.t = 2.
However, since m3. clock[3] = 2 it does not need to
save a forced checkpoint. In this case, C1,2
z
−→ C3,3,
C1,2.t < C3,3.t and a Z-consistent timestamping is
enforced.
In Fig. 4b, when P2 receives m2 from P3 a similar
scenario occurs. The partly-informed condition is true,
since m1.t = 1 and m2.t = 2. However, m2. clock[3] =
2 and P2 does not need to save a forced checkpoint.
When P2 receives m3 from P1 with m3.t = 2, the
partly-informed condition is true again. Nevertheless,
since clock2[3] = 2 a forced checkpoint is not nec-
essary. As in the previous example, C1,2
z
−→ C3,3,
C1,2.t < C3,3.t and a Z-consistent timestamping is
enforced.
A variation CFI 1 of the partly-informed checkpoint-
inducing condition, evaluated by process Pi when it
receives a message m and that takes into account the
value of lck up to Pi’s knowledge, can be expressed
as [10]:
CFI 1 ≡ ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧m.t > min toi[k] ∧
m.t > max(clocki[k],m. clock[k])
The CFI 1 condition can also be implemented with
a reduced set of data structures [10] to minimize the
cost of piggybacking information about the processes
causal past. In the FI algorithm, there is no need for a
process to know exactly which is the clock of another
process. It is just important to know if their clocks are
synchronized or not. Thus, FI can be rewritten using lc
P1 ✲❚
(1 0 0)
❚
C1,2
(2 0 0) (2 1 2)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m3
(2 1 2)
P2 ✲❚
(0 1 0)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m1
(0 1 0)
¬◆
(2 2 2)
P3 ✲❚
(0 0 1)
❚
(0 0 2)
(0 1 2)
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
m2
(0 1 2)
❚
C3,3
(0 1 3)
(a) m3.t = m3. clock[3] ∧ C1,2.t < C3,3.t
P1 ✲❚
(1 0 0)
❚
C1,2
(2 0 0)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m3
(2 0 0)
P2 ✲❚
(0 1 0)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m1
(0 1 0)
¬◆ (0 2 2) ¬◆
(2 2 2)
P3 ✲❚
(0 0 1)
❚
(0 0 2)
(0 1 2)
✁
✁
✁✁✕m2
(0 1 2)
❚
C3,3
(0 1 3)
(b) m3.t = clock2[3] ∧ C1,2.t < C3,3.t
P1 ✲❚
(1>>)
❚
C1,1
(2>>)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m3
(2>>)
P2 ✲❚
(>1>)
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m1
(>1>)
¬◆ (>1
=)
◆
C2,1
(>2>)
(=2>)
P3 ✲❚
(>>1)
(>=1)
✁
✁
✁✁✕m2
(>=1)
❚
C3,2
(>>2)
(c) m3.t > lc2 ∧ m3. greater[3]
Fig. 4. Strengthening the partly-informed strategy
and a vector of booleans greater instead of the vector
of integers clock.
Each entry greateri[k] is true if to the knowl-
edge of Pi its clock is greater than the clock of Pk
(greateri[k] ≡ clocki[i] > clocki[k]). When an entry
greateri[k] is false, clocki[i] must be equal to clocki[k];
their clocks are synchronized. Due to the update rules
of the timestamps, it is not possible that clocki[i] <
clocki[k]. Fig. 4c presents a distributed computation
with greater vectors, but instead of using true and
false to indicate the truthfulness/falseness of the pred-
icate we have used the signs > or =. The logical
clock of processes and messages are emphasized in
boldface and they are maintained in their positions in
the vectors.
When P2 receives m2 from P3 with m2.t = 1 it
triavially does not need to take a forced checkpoint.
When P2 receives m3 from P1 with m3.t = 2, since
m3. greater[3], P2 takes a forced checkpoint before
delivering m3. The FI condition can be stated as [10]:
CFI 1 ≡ ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧m. greater[k] ∧m.t > lci
5P1 ✲❚
(1>>)
[1 0 0]
❚
C1,2
(2>>)
[2 0 0]
(2>=)
[2 1 2]
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
m3
(2>=)
[2 1 2]
P2 ✲❚
(>1>)
[0 1 0]
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
m1
(>1>)
[0 1 0]
◆
C2,2
(>2>)
[0 2 0]
(=2=)
[2 22]
P3 ✲❚
(>>1)
[0 0 1]
(>=1)
[0 11]
❚
C3,2
(>>2)
[0 1 2]
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄✗
m2
(>>2)
[0 1 2]
Fig. 5. Fully-informed strategy
Breaking [µ,m] Z-cycles
Unfortunately, the CFI 1 condition strengthens the
partly-informed strategy more than it should. In
Fig. 5, P2 receives m3 from P1 with m3.t = 2 and
m3. greater[3] indicates that lc3 has already reached
2. However, if P2 had not taken a checkpoint before
delivering m3, a Z-cycle [m2,m3,m1] would had been
formed and C3,2 could had become a useless check-
point. Checkpoint vectors with taken marks can be
used to prevent this Z-cycle and any one composed
by a causal component µ and a single message m.
Let us assume that each process Pi maintains
and propagates a variation of the traditional vector
clock [23] that counts how many checkpoints have
been taken during the computation. The entry ckpti[i]
expresses exactly the number of checkpoints taken by
Pi and ckpti[k] counts how many checkpoints Pk has
taken to the best knowledge of Pi.
An extra boolean array takeni
1 can be used to in-
dicate if the causal components ending in the current
interval contain a checkpoint. An entry takeni[k] is
true if there is a causal zigzag path from Ck,ckpt
i
[k]
to Ci,ckpt
i
[i]+1 and this causal zigzag path includes
a checkpoint [10]. Fig. 5 shows a computation with
greater vectors and checkpoint vectors with taken
marks; an entry k of the checkpoint array is under-
lined only if taken[k] is true.
The condition to break [µ,m] Z-cycles can be ex-
pressed using the following condition CFI 2, evaluated
by process Pi when it receives a message m [10]:
CFI 2 ≡ m.ckpt[i] = ckpti[i] ∧m. taken[i]
The checkpoint-inducing condition of FI is an or-
operation of the conditions explained before:
CFI ≡ CFI 1 ∨CFI 2
Fig. 6 presents the code that implements FI [10].
1. The taken array has the opposite meaning of the boolean array
simple
i
(takeni[j] ≡ ¬ simplei[j]), defined in the context of a
checkpointing protocol [24] that enforces the Rollback Dependency
Trackability property [25].
take checkpoint():
for all k do
sent toi[k] ← false;
end for
for all k 6= i do
takeni[k] ← true;
greateri[k] ← true;
end for
lci ← lci+1;
Save the current state on stable memory;
ckpti[i] ← ckpti[i] + 1;
Pi’s initialization:
for all k do
ckpti[k] ← 0;
end for
lci ← 0;
takeni[i] ← false;
greateri[i] ← false;
take checkpoint();
Pi sends a message to Pk:
sent toi[k] ← true;
send(m, lci, greateri, ckpti, takeni) to Pk;
FI 1():
return ∃k : sent toi[k]∧m. greater[k]∧m.t > lci;
FI 2():
return m. ckpt[i] = ckpti[i] ∧m. taken[i];
Pi receives a message from Pj :
if FI 1()∨ FI 2() then
take checkpoint();
end if
if m.t > lci then
lci ← m.t
for all k 6= i do
greateri[k] = m. greater[k];
end for
else if m.t = lci then
for all k 6= i do
greateri[k] = greateri[k] ∧m. greater[k];
end for
end if
for all k 6= i do
if m. ckpt[k] > ckpti[k] then
ckpti[k] ← m. ckpt[k];
takeni[k] ← m. taken[k];
else if m. ckpt[k] = ckpti[k] then
takeni[k] ← takeni[k] ∨m. taken[k];
end if
end for
deliver (m)
Fig. 6. FI protocol [10]
6Pi . . . ✲❚
Ci,x
(2)
❚
Ci,x+1
(2)
Pk . . . ✲❚
Ck,z
(1)
✁
✁
✁✁✕m1
(1)
(a)
Pi . . . ✲❚
Ci,x
(2) +
❚
Ci,x+1
(3)
Pk . . . ✲❚
Ck,z
(2)
✁
✁
✁✁✕m1
(2)
(b)
Pi . . . ✲❚
Ci,x
(2) +
❚
Ci,x+1
(4)
Pk . . . ✲❚
Ck,z
(3)
✁
✁
✁✁✕m1
(3)
(c)
Fig. 7. Lazy indexing strategy
3.3 Lazy strategy
The lazy strategy reduces the number of forced check-
points necessary to produce a Z-consistent timestamp-
ing by detecting when a basic checkpoint can be taken
by a process Pi without incrementing its logical clock
lci. Let us consider the situation of a process Pi that
receives a single message m1 in a checkpoint interval
and later decides to take a basic checkpoint that ends
this interval, as depicted in Fig. 7. If m1.t < Ci,x.t, Pi
can reuse the same timestamp of Ci,x to label Ci,x+1
because Ck,z .t < Ci,x+1.t will still hold, as Fig. 7a
shows. However, if m1.t ≥ Ci,x.t, Pi must increment
lci to label Ci,x+1 in order to produce a Z-consistent
timestamping where Ck,z .t < Ci,x+1.t, as depicted in
Fig. 7b and Fig. 7c.
The lazy strategy can be implemented by introduc-
ing a flag increment that signals Pi it must increment
lci before taking a basic checkpoint. This flag is set to
false in the beginning of each checkpoint interval and
is set to true whenever a message with m.t ≥ lci is re-
ceived. The setting of the increment flag is illustrated
in Fig. 7 by a + sign.
Lazy-FI protocol
Let us try to apply the lazy approach to FI using
the vector greater. In Fig. 8a, when P2 receives m5
from P1 with a greater clock, it can verify that P3
have already reached the same clock. However, due
to the lazy strategy, P2 does not know whether P3
will increase its clock to save the next checkpoint.
Thus, a forced checkpoint before the delivering of m5
will be required in order to guarantee a Z-consistent
timestamping.
Fortunately, a small variation in the greater vector
allows the implementation of the lazy strategy. The
entry greateri[i] is set to false at every checkpoint and
set to true when a process set its increment flag [16].
To differentiate the vector used in Lazy-FI to the one
used in FI, we are going to introduce an equivalent
vector with an intuitive meaning: equal incr. Each
entry equal incri[k] is true if to the knowledge of
P1 ✲❚
(1>>>) +
❚
C1,2
(2>>>) +
❆
❆
❆❆❯
m5
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(a) lc and greater are not enough
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(b) lc and equal incr
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(c) lc, equal incr, ckptv, and taken
Fig. 8. Timestamp information to implement Lazy-FI
7take checkpoint():
for all k do
sent toi[k] ← false;
end for
for all k 6= i do
takeni[k] ← true;
end for
if increment then
lci ← lci+1;
for all k do
equal incri[k] ← false;
end for
end if
increment ← false;
Save the current state on stable memory;
ckpti[i] ← ckpti[i] + 1;
Pi’s initialization:
for all k do
ckpti[k] ← 0;
end for
lci ← 0;
increment ← true;
takeni[i] ← false;
take checkpoint();
Pi sends a message to Pk:
sent toi[k] ← true;
send(m, lci,
equal incri, ckpti, takeni) to Pk;
LAZY FI 1():
return ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧ ¬m. equal incr[k] ∧m.t > lci;
LAZY FI 2():
return m. ckpt[i] = ckpti[i] ∧m.taken[i];
Pi receives a message from Pj :
if LAZY FI 1()∨ LAZY FI 2() then
take checkpoint();
end if
if m.t > lci then
lci ← m.t;
incrementi ← true;
equal incr[i] ← true;
for all k 6= i do
equal incri[k] ← m. equal incri[k];
end for
else if m.t = lci then
incrementi ← true;
equal incr[i] ← true;
for all k do
equal incri[k]← equal incri[k]∨m. equal incri[k];
end for
end if
for all k 6= i do
if m. ckpt[k] > ckpti[k] then
ckpti[k] ← m. ckpt[k];
takeni[k] ← m. taken[k];
else if m. ckpt[k] = ckpti[k] then
takeni[k] ← takeni[k] ∨m. taken[k];
end if
end for
deliver(m);
Fig. 9. Lazy-FI protocol (adapted from [16])
Pi its clock is equal to the clock of Pk and Pk will
increase its clock before saving the next checkpoint.
When equal incri[k] is false, we have no additional
information whether the clock of Pi is greater or equal
to the clock of Pk.
Fig. 8b shows the propagation of equal incr and it
is very similar to Fig. 8a. Once again, instead of true
and false values, we have used the signs + and ≥.
Due to an extra message from P5, P3 will increase its
clock before saving the next checkpoint. P2 receives
this information and does not take a forced checkpoint
before delivering m7.
Fig. 8c shows another similar situation that empha-
sizes the need of the vectors ckpt and taken. Although
upon the reception of m7 P2 receives the information
that P3 will increase its clock, P2 will take a forced
checkpoint to break the Z-cycle [m7,m4,m6].
The conditions used in the Lazy-FI protocol can be
stated as follows:
CLazy-FI ≡ CLazy-FI 1 ∨CLazy-FI 2
CLazy-FI 1 ≡ ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧ ¬m. equal incr[k]∧
m.t > lci
CLazy-FI 2 ≡ CFI 2
Fig. 9 presents the code that implements the Lazy-FI
protocol [16] using the equal incr vector.
4 ATTEMPTS TO OPTIMIZE FI AND LAZY-FI
This section starts with a description of the FINE
approach to optimize FI. After that, it presents a
property that must be followed by all optimizations
of FI and proves that both FINE and Lazy-FINE do
not guarantee the absence of useless checkpoints.
4.1 The FINE approach
The basic FINE protocol tries to reduce the number
of forced checkpoints using the same data structures
as the FI protocol. Fig. 10 illustrates the approach. P2
has sent a message m1 to P3 with m1.t = 1. When
P2 receives m3 from P1, it verifies that m3.t > m1.t
and lc3, up to P2’s knowledge, has not reached 2
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✄
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✄
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[0 11]
❚
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(>>2)
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Fig. 10. Fine proposal
FINE 1()
return ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧m. greater[k]∧
m.t > lci ∧ m. taken[k]
Fig. 11. Checkpoint-inducing condition for CFINE 1 [19]
Lazy-FINE 1()
return ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧ ¬m. equal incr[k]∧
m.t > lci ∧ m. taken[k]
Fig. 12. Checkpoint-inducing condition for CLazy-FINE 1
(adapted from [19])
yet. However, since m3. taken[2] is false, the messages
involve no Z-cycle. They are called harmless cycles.
The basic FINE protocol is based on the following
condition [15]:
CFINE ≡ CFINE 1 ∨CFINE 2
where condition CFINE 1 can be expressed using a
greater vector [19] and CFINE 2 is equivalent to CFI 2.
CFINE 1 ≡ ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧m. greater[k]∧ m.t > lci ∧
m. taken[k]
CFINE 2 ≡ CFI 2
Fig. 11 presents the code that implements the
CFINE 1 predicate. The complete basic FINE protocol
is implemented by replacing the FI 1() with FINE 1()
in Fig. 6.
A lazy version of the FINE protocol, called Lazy-
FINE, has been proposed in the literature [19]. Let us
define the checkpoint inducing conditions using the
vector equal incr:
CLazy-FINE ≡ CLazy-FINE 1 ∨CLazy-FINE 2
CLazy-FINE 1 ≡ ∃k : sent toi[k] ∧ ¬m. equal incr[k] ∧
m.t > lci[i] ∧m.taken[i]
CLazy-FINE 2 ≡ CFI 2
Fig. 12 presents the code that implements the
CLazy-FINE 1 predicate. The complete basic Lazy-FINE
protocol is implemented by replacing the Lazy FI 1()
with Lazy FINE 1() in Fig. 9.
Pi ✲❚
Ci,x
(α+ δ)
❆❆
❆❆❯
ζ
Pj ✲❚
Cj,y
(α)
(a)
Pi ✲❚
Ci,x
(α+ δ)
❆❆
❆❆❯
ζ
Pj ✲❚
Cj,y
(α)
✁
✁
✁✕mj
(α)
(b)
Fig. 13. Necessity of a Z-consistent timestamping
4.2 FI’s optimization limits
The timestamps of Fig. 10 are not Z-consistent, since
C1,2
z
−→ C3,2 and C1,2.t = C3,2.t. This violation of
Z-consistency may appear innocuous at first, but it
violates an important property of any FI optimization.
Suppose one considers the CFI 1 ∧P ∨CFI 2 as capable
of producing a more efficient protocol, and CFI 2 is
kept exactly as in the original condition. Theorem 4.1
proves that CFI 1 ∧P must enforce a Z-consistent
timestamping to be a valid optimization.
Theorem 4.1. Any optimization of the FI protocol
whose checkpoint-inducing condition can be expressed as
CFI 1 ∧P ∨CFI 2, CFI 1 ∧P must enforce a Z-consistent
timestamping.
Proof: Assume an optimization of the FI protocol
with condition CFI 1 ∧P ∨CFI 2 where CFI 1 ∧P does
not enforce a Z-consistent timestamping. Thus, there
must be a computation with two checkpoints Ci,x
and Cj,y such as Ci,x
z
−→ Cj,y and Ci,x.t ≥ Cj,y.t.
For simplicity, let Ci,x.t = α + δ, Cj,y.t = α with
δ ≥ 0 and ζ be the zigzag path between Ci,x and Cj,y
(Fig. 13a). Depending on the properties of CFI 1 ∧P ,
this computation can be arbitrarily complex, involv-
ing other processes and requiring many messages
exchanges. Let us assume that this computation does
not enforce a Z-consistent timestamping, but has no
useless checkpoint.
We add to the computation another message mj
sent by Pj as the first event of the interval Ij,y and re-
ceived by Pi in the interval Ii,x after the first message
of ζ is sent (Fig. 13b). By our construction mj .t = α.
This implies that Ci,x 9 Cj,y , and that CFI 2 can never
be true. Evaluating CFI 1 at the time mj is received,
mj .t ≤ α + δ and no checkpoint is forced upon the
reception of mj , no matter the existence of P . Since ζ
must be non-causal, the z-cycle formed by mj and ζ
is not detected by CFI 2 and the protocol allowed the
occurrence of a useless checkpoint Cj,y .
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Fig. 14. A useless checkpoint under FINE
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Fig. 15. A useless checkpoint under Lazy-FINE
FINE may lead to useless checkpoints
According to Theorem 4.1, the CFINE 1 predicate pro-
duces a checkpointing protocol that does not guaran-
tee the absence of useless checkpoints. Indeed, Fig. 14
is a counterexample: it shows a possible continuation
of the scenario presented in Fig. 10 that leads to the
occurrence of a useless checkpoint. When P2 receives
m3 from P1, there is no Z-cycle known to P2 closed by
the receipt of m3. However, this does not exclude the
formation of a Z-cycle, undetected at the time m3 is
received.
Lazy-FINE may lead to useless checkpoints
Theorem 4.1 also informs us that the CLazy-FINE 1 pred-
icate does not guarantee the absence of useless check-
points. In Fig. 15, when P3 receives m4 from P2,
m4.t > lc3, but since ¬m.taken[3], [m4,m2,m3] would
form just a harmless Z-cycle. However, P3 receivesm5
from P4 with m5.t = lc3 no forced checkpoint is taken
and a Z-cycle m5,m4,m2 is formed.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper reviewed index-based checkpointing pro-
tocols and proved that the FINE and Lazy-FINE pro-
tocols do not guarantee the absence of useless check-
points. This paper also reinforces that all optimiza-
tions of FI must enforce a Z-consistent timestamping.
As a consequence, FI and Lazy-FI can be rolled back
to the position of most efficient index-based protocols;
whether or not they can be further optimized remains
an open problem.
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